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A B S T R A C T 
In arguing that sex and gender must be taken seriously as areas of philosophical interest, de Sousa and Morgan assume that, if properly practiced, 
science and philosophy are essentially emancipatory. Several questions are raised about the efficacy and implication of this assumption. 
R E S U M E 
Dans leur discussion de l'importanced'inclure le sexeet le genre dans l'etudc de la philosophie, de Sousa et Morgan supposentque. dans leur pratique 
adequate, la philosophie et les sciences sont primordialement emancipatoires. Plusieurs questions se posent concernant les implications et 1'efficacite 
de leur postulat. 
De Sousa and M o r g a n establish without doubt that sex 
and gender are proper objects for phi losophica l analysis 
and that feminist analysis has especially important con-
tributions to make i n this area. T o take each of these 
central points in turn, they show that it is s imply dis in-
genuous to foreclose p h i l o s o p h i c a l analysis of sex and 
gender on the presumption that it is "just n a t u r a l " and, 
therefore, has no theoretical, phi losophica l content, the 
pr imary rationale that they reconstruct for phi losophica l 
silence o n the subject. T h i s presupposes an essentialist 
conception of sex and gender w h i c h is itself h ighly theo-
retical and problematic. Feminist analyses make it clear, 
moreover, that it is not on ly a theoretical but also a social , 
pol i t i ca l construct. By natural iz ing sex and gender, essen-
t ial ism not only obscures its o w n theoretical status but, at 
the same time, reinforces the exis t ing sex-gender system, 
portraying it as a funct ion of b iological conditions that 
cannot be altered by pol i t i ca l agendas for change. It is this 
shift i n perspective, this insight, afforded specifically by 
feminist work i n the area, that makes sex and gender 
visible as an object of critical phi losophica l inquiry . 
Rather than p u r s u i n g questions about h o w we m i g h t 
fo l low up de Sousa and Morgan's init iative i n the analysis 
of gender, I propose to consider some encompassing issues 
about the emancipatory potential of science and phi lo -
sophy that their discussion raises. De Sousa and M o r g a n 
h o l d that phi losophy is "essentially subversive and demo-
cratic ," that it has " n o authorities" (p. 14), given its central 
commitment to the refinement of argument, specifically, 
argument that leads to creative insight. A s imi lar theme 
emerges i n their discussion of scientific studies of sex and 
gender where they insist that the biases and distortions 
exposed by feminist critics of sex research are examples of 
"pseudo-science." T h e i m p l i c a t i o n seems to be that 
science, properly conducted (real science?), is subversive 
and democratic as wel l , at least i n the sense that it provides 
the tools for s h o w i n g that sexist assumptions are empir i -
cally false. If the analysis holds, then i n both cases de 
Sousa and M o r g a n endorse enlightenment ideals w h i c h 
more radical critics of science and phi losophy reject out-
right o n grounds that they presuppose what amounts to a 
methodological essentialism. I am generally sympathetic 
to de Sousa and Morgan's posi t ion but it cannot be 
assumed without argument, specifically, argument to the 
effect that feminist post-modern critics go too far i n their 
reaction against the fai l ings of enlightenment projects. In 
the cri t ical , exploratory spirit that de Sousa and M o r g a n 
endorse, I w i l l make a start i n taking up this challenge by 
indica t ing the questions it raises about their o w n argu-
ments for phi losophica l analysis of sex and gender. 
Consider, first, the view that phi losophica l discourse is 
essentially emancipatory. De Sousa and M o r g a n argue 
this on the ground that phi losophica l argument seeks the 
k i n d of insight associated w i t h consciousness raising; it is 
a matter of " d r a w i n g attention to facts w h i c h have passed 
u n n o t i c e d " and f o l l o w i n g through their impl icat ions i n 
formula t ing anew, or reformulating, best explanations for 
these facts. In the process this may involve revisions of 
framework assumptions w h i c h , i n turn, "make [it possi-
ble to] see something that was invisible even though it 
was, i n a sense, always i n f u l l v i e w " (p. 14). T w o meta-
phors are at work here: the first is that of " ra i s ing from our 
consciousness" i n a quasi-psychoanalytic sense of self-
directed i n q u i r y , and the second is that of "seeing what 
there is to see" outside ourselves typical of more tradi-
tional externally-directed inquiry . T h e connection between 
the two is that the framework assumptions, usually held 
unconsciously (as unproblematic or unquestionable), 
make some things seem obvious and unproblematic (read-
i ly explicable) whi le they obscure others absolutely. 
Switches i n framework assumptions (e.g. as accomplished 
by p h i l o s o p h i c a l argument may make new things "vis-
i b l e , " whi le care i n attending to "new facts" may direct 
cr i t ical attention back onto these assumptions; work i n 
either d imens ion alters the other, and work i n both is 
essential. 
It is perhaps signif icant that a central theme i n litera-
ture o n the role of consciousness rais ing i n the women's 
movement is the insistence that it is not a form of therapy, 
not just inward-directed self-theorizing, as it were, but a 
method of theorizing (or retheorizing) the reality con-
fronted externally (see M a c K i n n o n , 1981; and the Red-
stockings, 1970). O n my reading, de Sousa and M o r g a n 
take the model of consciousness rais ing to be instructive 
precisely because it requires that the process of philoso-
phica l i n q u i r y incorporate both an external and an inter-
nal d imens ion . It is a ra i s ing to consciousness of sub-
merged framework assumptions w h i c h both transform 
and are transformed by what we see of external conditions 
and objects of i n q u i r y . More specifically, it is this dialecti-
cal feature of ph i losophica l practice w h i c h assures its 
" l ibera t ing novelty of vision. . .a central ideal of p h i l o -
s o p h y " (p. 15). 
Against de Sousa and Morgan's optimist ic vis ion of 
phi losophy there is a g r o w i n g tradition of cri t ic ism that 
sees ph i losophica l discourse as hav ing played a central 
role i n oppressive cul tural projects of intellectual and 
pol i t i ca l authori tar ianism (e.g., Rorty, 1979, 1985; and 
more radically, post-moderns l ike Lyotard, as discussed by 
Rorty , 1985). These critics take the art iculat ion and legit-
i m a t i o n of dominant ideologies to be at least as essential a 
feature of phi losophy as the generation of emancipatory 
insights. In some cases they suggest not just that p h i l o -
sophy served such ends at some junctures (contingently), 
but that, as a discipl ine committed to te l l ing meta-stories, 
it is inevitable that phi losophy w o u l d play the role of 
master discipl ine, reproducing and legi t imating authorit-
ar ian structures whatever its l iberating aspirations. Fre-
quently the culpri t cited is phi losophica l method itself. As 
M o u l t o n (1980) has shown, i n another connection, stand-
ard adversarial, analytic practice a l l too easily takes terri-
tory def ini t ion and defence as its pr imary a i m , entrench-
i n g existing framework assumptions and foreclosing 
systematic cri t ic ism of them. A g a i n , far from seeing this as 
an aberration, many w h o m procla im the death of p h i l o -
sophy, or the need to move beyond phi losophy, take such 
practice to be as essential to phi losophy as (indeed, is an 
outgrowth of) critical argumentation of the sort endorsed 
by de Sousa and Morgan. 
De Sousa and Morgan might wel l accept the general 
(often historical) l ine of crit icism developed by Rorty and 
by various post-modern critics but insist that the i l legi t i -
mate foundational ism to w h i c h they object (one instance 
of w h i c h is essentialist t h i n k i n g about sex and gender) 
results from a perversion of phi losophica l method; it is 
bad or failed phi losophy w h i c h is at issue, not phi losophy 
as such. Certainly, it w o u l d seem that they must be pre-
pared to argue something a long these lines if they are to 
sustain the thesis that phi losophy is essentially emancipa-
tory. As it stands, however, the strategy they adopt here is 
problematic. They characterize properly subversive and 
democratic phi losophy i n terms of ocular metaphors; it is 
a process of m a k i n g visible what was invisible i n w h i c h it 
is understood that " i n the end, insight must come from 
just seeing what there is to see" (p. 14). T h e i r o p t i m i s m 
about the emancipatory potential of phi losophy seems to 
depend on just the sort of foundationalism that initiated 
the radical critique, an epistemic counterpart to the essen-
tialism they reject i n moral , pol i t ica l theory. 
If this analysis is correct, a number of questions arise. Is 
there really a determinate reality—a set of facts—out there, 
w a i t i n g to be seen (or seen better) when, through p h i l o -
sophical analysis, the conceptual scales fal l from our eyes? 
It is intended that real phi losophy is an enterprise dist in-
guished by methods that afford special access to such a 
reality, exposing distortions and gaps i n earlier percep-
tions of it? If so, what assures that contact has been made; 
what distinguishes genuine from il lusory insight? It 
w o u l d seem to be that even the jo int requirements of 
explanatory power and empir ical adequacy (both cited by 
de Sousa and Morgan) under-determine phi losophical 
theories as much as they do scientific theories and, i n this 
case, the question arises, what other virtues govern the 
evaluation of alternatives? Is subversiveness and/or alle-
giance to democratic ideals such a virtue i n and of itself? Is 
it a mark of truth or at least the reduction of error, or does it 
represent the endorsement of appeal to noncognitive 
(pragmatic, poli t ical) considerations i n philosophy? 
S i m i l a r issues arise i n connection w i t h de Sousa and 
Morgan 's discussion of empir ica l sex and gender research. 
They show how those w h o have adopted a feminist per-
spective have been able to see clearly the anomalies and 
inconsistencies generated by dogmatic commitment to the 
assumption that sex is biological ly determined and essen-
tial ly d i m o r p h i c . A l l efforts to substantiate these central 
assumptions have failed and the tradition of i n q u i r y 
founded o n them has persisted i n the form of pseudo-
science; it quite transparently seeks out and accepts, or if 
necessary, makes up only evidence that supports the core 
assumptions of sexual essentialism. De Sousa and M o r -
gan's cri t ic ism of this research is not that researchers were 
conceptually blinkered by deeply rooted assumptions and 
that the insight afforded by feminist theory was necessary 
before certain obvious but invisible facts of the matter 
could be recognized (although this seems a factor i n some 
cases). Rather, the charge is that these researchers should 
have recognized the relevant facts as fa ls i fying whatever 
their conceptual commitments. Indeed, there is some sug-
gestion that they d i d recognize them as falsifying, given 
that they deliberately undertook to suppress or revise these 
facts. In the m a i n the case is not conceptually ambiguous; 
by their o w n methodological standards sex researchers 
should not have supported the dominant thesis through 
m u c h of the period it has been inf luent ia l . As i n the case of 
phi losophy w h i c h refuses to take sex and gender seriously, 
de Sousa and Morgan's objection is that the science i n 
question is s imply bad science, not "science-as-usual" (to 
use Harding ' s terms). It lay to feminist critics, w h o d i d not 
have a vested interest i n p r o m o t i n g the essentialist dogma, 
to draw attention to suppressed counter-evidence and 
internal inconsistencies, and to articulate their falsi fying 
impl icat ions . In this it w o u l d seem their activities were 
not so m u c h a matter of achieving new insight but of 
exposing deliberate obscurantism, even dishonesty, i n the 
treatment of counter-evidence. 
In this discussion, de Sousa and M o r g a n assume at least 
the possibil i ty of d is t inguishing between good and bad, or 
real and pseudo-science. T o this end they identify three 
criteria of demarcation: pseudo-science is said to start w i t h 
conclusions, it rushes to explanatory conclusions on the 
basis of imaginary evidence, and it propounds positive-
biased statistical i l lusions. They acknowledge that the first 
criteria is problematic as a d is t inguishing mark of pseudo-
science; the hypothetico-deductive method, the mainstay 
of testing practice i n science, could fairly be described as 
starting w i t h conclusions. What seems at issue w i t h the 
latter two more p r o m i s i n g criteria is, first, that pseudo-
science typically suppresses, misrepresents, misanalyzes, 
and even fabricates data (its treatment of the data is 
methodological ly unacceptable, even deliberately dishon-
est) and, second, that it fails to make test theories of con-
clusions properly responsive to the data. It is a we l l 
rehearsed point since Lakatos and K u h n , however, that 
failure to meet these requirements is a frequent feature of 
real science where p r o m i s i n g theories are protected from 
premature falsif ication whi le their details are being deve-
loped. It has proven notoriously di f f icul t to give a general 
account of the conditions under w h i c h such practice is 
legitimate; typically such judgments can only be made 
retrospectively, i n l ight of the performance of the mature 
theory, and even then they are always open to revision as 
research i n the area continues to unfo ld . It seems likely 
that n o very clear boundaries can be d r a w n between real 
and pseudo-science, even if the criteria of success (e.g., 
empir ica l adequacy) are uncontentious and certainly the 
status of these criteria is itself open to question. 
It does seem plausible, nonetheless, that really perni-
cious cases of sexist bias c o u l d be identif ied and rejected as 
bad science on internally accepted criteria of adequacy. 
Certainly the sex research discussed by de Sousa and M o r -
gan fits this category; by their o w n lights, the researchers 
i n question were d o i n g pseudo- (even fraudulent) science. 
Even if this is accepted, s t i l l more general questions arise 
about the status of these internal criteria and the presump-
tion, w h i c h seem to underlie de Sousa and Morgan's dis-
cussion, that good science, unl ike pseudo-science, w o u l d 
not produce nor tolerate sexist bias of the sort associated 
w i t h sex research; it is self-cleansing of intrusive bias and, 
i n this sense, democratic and subversive i n the way good 
phi losophy is, on de Sousa and Morgan's account. In this 
they seem to h o l d what H a r d i n g (1986) describes as " f emi -
nist e m p i r i c i s m " (p. 24). W h i l e I am sympathetic w i t h this 
pos i t ion—I want not to lose the possibil i ty of demonstrat-
i n g that sexist presuppositions are just false i n terms 
accepted by their proponents—it is significant that many 
feminist critics w h o begin w i t h criticisms of bad science 
(much l ike de Sousa and Morgan's) end u p wary of 
betrayal by respectable science-as-usual. T h e i r analyses 
make it clear that scientific method is not, on its o w n , 
proof against ideologically induced bias; even methodo-
logical ly sound science can produce sexist results if the 
assumptions that frame it import sexist bias. Indeed, some 
critics argue more radically that scientific method is itself a 
source of such bias (Stanley and Wise, 1983, p p . 22-23). 
T h e question arises whether science might not be inher-
ently sexist, either because it is incapable of systematically 
exposing and e l i m i n a t i n g sexist bias and, therefore, can-
not but reproduce this bias, or more radically, because it 
embodies essentially androcentric preoccupations and 
may, therefore, generate such bias. 
A l t h o u g h the f u l l force and credibility of these worries is 
s t i l l an open question, they are by no means obviously 
unfounded. One powerful source of support for them, 
relevant here, derives from the observation that feminist 
empiric ists have a great deal of di f f icul ty e x p l a i n i n g the 
success of feminist critics i n exposing what comes to be 
seen as insupportable bias. T h i s is a cri t ic ism developed in 
detail by H a r d i n g (1986, chapter 6); if scientific method 
does eliminate any marks of i n d i v i d u a l standpoint and 
orientat ion, how are we to expla in the greater objectivity 
that results when researchers adopt a feminist standpoint? 
Inasmuch as the feminist crit ique of sex research does 
amount to more than the exposure of fraud—it turns, at 
some points, o n a reconceptualization of sex as a social 
construct—it w o u l d seem that its success must be explained 
i n terms of the distinctive (poli t ical , personal) perspective 
that the critics brought to bear as feminist, precisely a 
factor that should not play a role i n good (unbiased) 
science. T o the extent that these broader critiques of 
science-as-usual raise credible worries, they seriously 
undermine the enlightenment faith that de Sousa and 
M o r g a n sustain i n the emancipatory potential of science. 
T h e y suggest that a feminist perspective is more a source 
of democratic, subversive insight than scientific method as 
such. 
General questions remain about what emancipatory 
potential science really has, i n what it consists, and what 
forms of i n q u i r y or insti tutions w i l l best realize it. There 
are some pre l iminary lessons to be drawn i n this connec-
t ion f rom de Sousa and Morgan's account of why feminist 
phi losophy is powerful ly ins ightful . By analogy with 
their analysis of phi losophy, perhaps it could be argued 
that i n many cases feminist critics of science are able to 
recognize inconsistencies i n practice, as wel l as see new 
facts and their impl icat ions for the development of 
i n q u i r y , because of a shift i n the assumptions they h o l d 
constant. Some presuppositions about the nature of the 
subject phenomena must inevitably be made; not every-
t h i n g can be tested at once, and feminist researchers pro-
ceed by revising the accepted priorities, given their po l i t i -
cal commitments. If scientific method is merely a probative 
tool and not proof against bias i n and of itself (to take a 
posi t ion intermediate between faith i n the emancipatory 
power of science and pessimism about its inherent andro-
centrism), it is the use feminists make of it given a p o l i t i -
cally inspired conceptual shift that assures their emanci-
patory insights. One impl icat ion of de Sousa and Morgan's 
analysis is that if science is to have any emancipatory 
potential it must incorporate phi losophica l analysis of the 
presuppositions of practice—theoretical and methodolog-
ical—that is designed to make framework assumptions a 
more routine object of critical assessment. 
T h i s is only a part ial answer since the emancipatory 
potential of phi losophical analysis also requires explica-
t ion; it is unclear what status accrues to the new facts 
brought into view in the process of reformulating frame-
work assumptions, and how the framework assumptions 
themselves are to be assessed when there are alternatives 
available that make equally good sense of the facts they 
deem significant. Certainly, it w o u l d seem unavoidable 
that our best, even our most subversive and democratic 
theories, represent a temporary stopping point, not con-
clusive (undistorted) access to what there is to see. One 
endur ing lesson from the radical critics of both philos-
ophy and science is that we must resist any form of method-
ological essentialism about science and phi losophy. It is 
unl ike ly that any given method could prove essentially 
emancipatory, and it is probable that our best understand-
i n g (phi losophical or scientific) w i l l always bear the mark 
of power-structures and interests whose genesis and l i m -
itations are obscure to us. It is to be hoped that, i n pursu-
i n g empirical and phi losophica l research on sex and 
gender, it w i l l become clearer that emancipatory potential 
science and phi losophy retain i n face of reactions w h i c h 
conclude either that both are inherently pernicious or, i n 
the case of phi losophy, that its only benign opt ion is 
free-wheeling conversation w h i c h remains deliberately 
marginal to active h u m a n enterprises. 
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